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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than 
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; 
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every 
particular power necessary for doing it, is included.1 
 
James Madison 
 
This government is acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers.  The principle, that it can exercise only 
the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have 
required to be enforced by all those arguments which it 
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the 
people, found it necessary to urge.  That principle is now 
universally admitted.  But the question respecting the extent 
of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will 
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.2 
 
Chief Justice John Marshall 
 
These words, spoken by two great American patriots, describe the 
difficulty of a federalist government and summarize a problem that has 
plagued federal courts from the beginning of the nation: what can the 
federal government do and how can it do it?3  In defending the so-called 
“necessary and proper clause,” President Madison notes that 
Congressional power is not strictly limited to the words directly 
enunciated in the Constitution, but instead that Congress must have 
implied power to implement and exercise the enumerated powers.4  That 
being said, Chief Justice Marshall’s words are profound and prophetic – 
we are a government of limited power, though the scope of that power is 
often undefined.5  Over time the Supreme Court has become the final 
interpreter of the scope of those powers under the constraints of the 
Constitution.6  Each branch of the government, however, should partake 
in constitutional analysis.  Occasionally, there is evidence that this 
 
 1  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 289 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).  
 2  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).  
 3  See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (discussing the general principles 
of federalism). 
 4  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1. 
 5  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405. 
 6  See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Why I Still Teach Marbury (and so should you): A Response 
to Professor Levinson, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 578-79 (2004). 
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constitutional analysis occurs, through legislative history, presidential 
veto statements, or presidential signing statements, but this evidence is 
neither consistent nor transparent to the citizenry of the nation.7  More 
often than not, there is a lack of evidence that it occurs at all. 
In 1996, for example, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”).8  DOMA § 2 declared, that no state would be required to 
recognize same sex marriages simply because another state recognized 
these marriages, and § 3 defined the terms “marriage” and “spouse” for 
all federal law and regulation purposes.9  DOMA was referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives, which 
identified the two primary purposes of DOMA as “defend[ing] the 
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” and “protect[ing] the 
right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal 
recognition of same-sex unions.”10  The Committee did note, however, 
that the legislation set forth four government interests: (1) defending and 
nurturing traditional marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of 
morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and self-governance; and (4) 
preserving scarce government resources.11  In analyzing the bill, the 
Committee noted that it was a direct response to the impending action of 
Hawaiian courts towards recognizing same-sex marriage.12  With regard 
to the purposes, the Committee affirmed that the Full Faith and Credit 
clause of the Constitution could result in legal issues amongst the states 
that had differing definitions of marriage.13  While the Committee reports 
point to the potential problems that the legislation was attempting to 
avoid, nowhere in the report does it address the authority for Congress to 
pass this legislation.14  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution does not 
include any power for Congress to create this type of legislation or 
definition unless it falls under the Necessary and Proper Clause or the 
 
 7  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1 (1824) (discussing the enactment of the 
Commerce Clause); The Presidential Signing Statements Act, S. 1747, 110th Cong. §§ 2(4), 
2(6) (2007) (explaining reasons why courts had sporadically used presidential signing 
statements as sources for interpretation); Veto of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, 
H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (statement of President George W. Bush discussing 
the “serious constitutional concerns” of the bill).  While this statement did not outline those 
concerns, it does indicate that some constitutional evaluation was done. 
 8  United States. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).  
 9  Id. at 2683; Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996) (declaring 
that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”). 
 10  Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996). 
 11  Id. at 12.  
 12  Id.  
 13  Id. at 8.  
 14  Id. 
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Commerce Clause.15  While the Supreme Court did not find that Congress 
had exceeded its authority, it was the Court that addressed the scope of 
authority, without reference to any Congressional action or statement.16  
It is unclear from either the committee reports or the Supreme Court 
opinion whether Congress performed any analysis related to the scope of 
its power. 
It is a rare event that legislation is passed by Congress outside the 
scope of its authority, and then signed by the President.17  Even so, from 
the founding of our nation through the present, at least 172 pieces of 
legislation that were passed by Congress and signed by the President were 
later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.18  In general, the legislation has been deemed unconstitutional 
either because the subject matter was outside the enumerated powers of 
Congress or because the legislation was properly passed under some 
constitutional authority but in violation of another provision of the 
Constitution.19 
This article briefly explores the legislative authority of Congress and 
the President, both the nature and the scope of that authority.  The article 
then looks at current constitutional analysis: where, and how, it may 
occur in each branch of the government.  The article then reviews 
legislative attempts to influence that process.  Specifically, the article 
looks at the Line-Item Veto Act, the Presidential Signing Statements Act, 
and the Enumerated Powers Act.  Finally, the paper argues that it is the 
responsibility of each branch to cooperate to clarify the nature of the 
constitutional authority for federal actions, and to develop a more 
thoughtful and transparent analysis of legislation.  This would allow the 
judicial branch to interpret the scope of Congress’ powers, rather than 
waste time evaluating the legislation to determine whether it has a strong 
foundation in the constitution prior to addressing the scope issue when 
faced with challenges to legislation. 
 
 15  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.  When the Supreme Court heard this case, it did note that 
Congress had passed legitimate laws relating to marriage as it related to federal programs.  
See, e.g. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690. 
 16  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2695. 
 17  LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: ACTS OF CONGRESS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN WHOLE OR IN 
PART BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, available at https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-10.pdf. According to the Supreme 
Court database, 14 acts not listed were declared unconstitutional between 2009-2016. See 
Spaeth et al., Supreme Court Database 1 (2016), available at 
http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org.  A review of Supreme Court slip opinions after 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), shows that no more acts of Congress have 
been declared unconstitutional through Voisine v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2272 (2016).  
 18  Spaeth, supra note 17. 
 19  See, e.g., United States. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
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II.  CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
A. The  Article  I, Section 8 Powers of Congress 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants powers to Congress, 
some as seemingly narrow as the power to “establish post offices and post 
roads” and others as potentially broad as the power to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”20  These enumerated powers limit Congress’ ability to 
act, reserving other actions to state or local governments.21  The exact 
breadth of those Congressional powers, however, is left to 
interpretation.22  History has left the breadth of those enumerated powers 
to the discretion of the Supreme Court of the United States, through its 
power of judicial review.23 
In addition to the struggle over the scope and limits of the 
enumerated powers, Congress, the executive branch, and the courts have 
had to evaluate what sort of power is given to Congress under the 
Necessary and Proper clause.24  The final clause in Article I, Section 8 
gives Congress the power “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into [e]xecution the foregoing [p]owers, and all 
other [p]owers vested by this Constitution in the [g]overnment of the 
United States, or in any [d]epartment or [o]fficer thereof.”25  This 
Necessary and Proper clause has been the subject of much discussion in 
legal journals over the years.26 
In the 44th Federalist paper, James Madison described the public 
outcry against the Necessary and Proper clause as an outcry of form over 
substance.27  Madison argued that the substance of the clause, to delegate 
 
 20  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 7 (regarding the postal offices and commerce). 
 21  See U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 22  See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 34 (discussing the breadth of national power compared 
to state power); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937) (declaring that 
activities with a close relationship to interstate commerce may be regulated by Congress); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (declaring that intrastate activities that impact 
interstate commerce may be regulated); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241, 355 (1964) (declaring that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a valid exercise of 
Congressional commerce power despite no evidence that Congress even contemplated that as 
the source of authority for the bill). 
 23  See infra Part II.C. 
 24  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  See generally Celestine Richards McConville, The (Not 
so Dire) Future of the Necessary and Proper Power after National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369 (2015) (discussing recent Necessary 
and Proper analysis). 
 25  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
 26  An online search through the LexisNexis found almost 1000 law review articles 
containing the terms “Necessary and Proper” and “constitutional authority.”  
 27  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.   
YORDY-8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2017  12:21 PM 
92 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1 
some unspecified but needed powers to Congress, was essential.28  He 
then reasoned that any objection to the clause must be about the manner 
in which the powers were delegated.29  Madison posited four possible 
forms of interpretation: first, to prohibit any power not expressly 
delegated (copying the Articles of Confederation and essentially 
strangling Congress); second, to enumerate a complete list of powers 
which might be considered necessary and proper; third, to clarify 
“necessary and proper” by stating exactly what is neither necessary nor 
proper; or fourth, to remain silent on the issue and leave interpretation of 
Congressional power to future construction and inference.30  The basics 
of Madison’s arguments were that the Necessary and Proper clause was 
nothing more than an explicit grant of Congress’s legislative power under 
the Constitution.31 
Even so, just two years after Madison left the presidency, the 
Supreme Court declared that Congress has power beyond the strict 
reading of Article I, Section 8.32  In McCullough v. Maryland, the Court 
upheld Congressional power to create a national bank based on its power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to “lay and collect taxes; to 
borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and 
to raise and support armies and navies.”33  In his discussion, Chief Justice 
John Marshall remarked, “[a]mong the enumerated powers, we do not 
find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation.  But there is no 
phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, 
excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that 
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described.”34  Since 
that landmark decision, the scope of the enumerated powers has been 
addressed on a case-by-case, or power-by-power, basis.  As such, 
analyzing the extent of the powers is something that has been, and should 
be, done by all three branches of government. 
B. The Article I, Section 7 Powers of the President 
The powers of the President and the Executive Branch are primarily 
outlined in Article II of the Constitution.35  The veto power of the 
President, however, does not exist in Article II of the Constitution, but 
 
 28  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1. 
 29  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1. 
 30  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1. 
 31  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1. 
 32  See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-07.  
 33  Id. at 407, 411-12.  
 34  Id. at 406.  
 35  See U.S. CONST. art. II. 
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instead exists in Article I, Section 7, under the powers of Congress.36  
Article I, Section 7 states: 
Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, 
be presented to the President of the United States; if he 
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his 
objections to that House in which it shall have 
originated. . .”37 
In the Supreme Court’s well-known “Presentment Clause” case, 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, Chief Justice Burger 
wrote that the founders of the nation believed that presentment to the 
President was “so imperative that [they] took special pains to assure that 
[it] could not be circumvented.”38 
A plain reading of this provision would indicate that, if the President 
does not approve the entire piece of legislation, he or she must veto it and 
send it back to Congress to address the problematic passages within the 
legislation.39  If, for example, Congress passes a spending bill that 
includes provisions for a “bridge to nowhere,” and the President does not 
wish to sign the bill, the President should veto the entire bill and send it 
back to Congress noting the disapproval of that one provision.40  
Congress then must decide to amend the bill, draft a new bill, or override 
the veto with the required two-thirds of the majority.41  Supporting this 
reading, President Washington specifically stated that the Presentment 
Clause of Article I, Section 7, required him to either “approve all the parts 
 
 36  U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2. 
 37  U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2. 
 38  INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983). 
 39  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 440 n.30 (1988) (citing 33 WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)). 
 40  See Ronald D. Utt, The Bridge to Nowhere: A National Embarrassment (2005), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/the-bridge-to- 
nowhere-a-national-embarrassment.  The genesis of the discussion comes from a section of a 
budget bill in the 109th Congress.  See, e.g., Transportation, Treasure, Housing and Urban 
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-15, § 186 (2005); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440 n.30 
(citing 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)). 
 41  As of August 18, 2016, the most recent veto override was under President George W. 
Bush.  President Bush vetoed H.R. 6331, entitled, “Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008.”  The bill was introduced in Congress on June 20, 2008, presented to 
the President on July 10, 2008 after passing both the House and Senate.  President Bush vetoed 
it on July 15 and both houses of Congress voted to override the veto that same day.  See, e.g., 
Actions Overview of H.R.6331, CONGRESS, available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-
congress/house-bill/6331/actions.  In the history of the United States, only 110 of 2570 vetoes 
(4.28%) have been overridden.  See Summary of Bills Vetoed, SENATE, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/ 
reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm.  
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of a Bill, or reject it in total.”42  However, if the President signs the 
legislation into law and there is a challenge to that law, then the judicial 
branch enters the discussion to assess the constitutionality. 
C. The Article III, Powers of the Judiciary 
Article III of the Constitution established the Judicial Branch and 
outlined its power to include “all [c]ases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the [l]aws of the United States, and [t]reaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their [a]uthority”43  The Constitution does not 
include any discussion of the judiciary’s role in interpreting federal law. 
That came from an early, and very famous, Supreme Court opinion.44 
In the politically charged Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John 
Marshall was faced with a terrific dilemma.45  President Adams had 
appointed Marbury to a federal judgeship.46  Marbury’s commission was 
not delivered prior to President Adams leaving office and President 
Jefferson taking office.47  Jefferson did not want the commission 
delivered and, in fact, made his own judicial appointments.48  Marbury 
asked the Court for a writ of mandamus; thus, forcing Jefferson’s 
Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the commission.49  If the 
Court granted the writ and Madison ignored it, then the Court had no way 
to enforce the writ, thus, rendering the Court less powerful than the other 
branches of government.50  At the same time, the Court wanted it known 
that Madison was in violation of Marbury’s rights, quite possibly because 
the members of the Court were all appointed by Adam’s political party.51 
In Marbury, Marshall was very clear that Marbury was legitimately 
appointed and should receive his commission as a judge.52  Once he 
established that Marbury had been wronged when denied his commission, 
 
 42  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440 n.30 (citing 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)). 
 43  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 44  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 45  See Symposium, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and 
Why You Shouldn’t Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 573 (2003). 
 46  See Symposium, Marbury v. Madison and the Revolution of 1800: John Marshall, the 
Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis, 1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 291-344 
(2003). 
 47  Id. at 292. 
 48  Id.  
 49  Id. at 289. 
 50  See Mark A. Graber, Legal Scholarship Symposium: The Scholarship of Sanford 
Levinson: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. 
REV. 609, 639 (2003). 
 51  Id.  In fact, Marshall was Adams Secretary of State when the appointments were made.  
 52  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167-68 (1803). 
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Marshall analyzed the constitutionality of the procedural law, passed by 
Congress and signed by the President, which gave original jurisdiction to 
the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus.53  Marbury had asked 
the Court to utilize this jurisdiction to issue the writ and force Secretary 
of State Madison to deliver the commission.  Justice Marshall determined 
that Congress did not have authority to pass the law, because it attempted 
to alter the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, a power not 
granted to Congress in the Constitution.54  This original proclamation of 
judicial review may be the foundation for the theory that the Legislative 
Branch makes the laws, the executive branch enforces the laws, and the 
judicial branch interprets the laws. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN THE THREE BRANCHES 
The President, members of Congress, and Justices of the Supreme 
Court all take oaths to support and uphold the Constitution.55  That being 
the case, the members of each branch should perform a constitutional 
analysis before taking any action to ensure that they are working within 
the limits of their authority.  Members of Congress should not introduce 
legislation without first analyzing the constitutionality of the legislation.  
The President should not sign legislation without some constitutional 
analysis, either.  The Supreme Court then has (under our current system) 
the final word on whether the constitutional interpretation by the 
President and Congress was correct.56  Without any input from the other 
branches, the Supreme Court must analyze which provision, if any, 
authorizes the federal action, and then evaluate the parameters of that 
constitutional provision to determine if the action falls within the scope 
of that power.  If there are no challenges to federal action, the Supreme 
Court never performs that analysis.  Under our current system, analysis 
by the legislative and executive branches is sporadic at best. 
A. Congressional Analysis 
At least occasionally, it is clear that Congress performs a 
constitutional analysis as bills are debated and discussed.  For example, 
in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court pointed to legislative 
 
 53  Id. at 174-76. 
 54  Id. at 173-76. 
 55  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2016).  
The words of the oaths vary, with the President’s oath being directly scripted in the 
constitution and the others being scripted by statute.  The essence of all the oaths is essentially 
a promise to support the principles of the constitution and a faithful execution of the duties of 
the office as set forth in the constitution, and perhaps even the constitutionally passed statutes. 
 56  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167-68 (1803).   
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history to demonstrate that Congress was relying on its Commerce Clause 
power in passing the Violence Against Women Act.57  In Sabri v. United 
States, the Court reviewed a statute passed by Congress making it a crime 
to bribe officials of entities that receive a certain level of federal funds.58  
Justice Souter again used legislative history to determine that Congress 
intended to enact the law under its spending power in Article I, Section 
8.59  In declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional 
as applied to state and local governments, the Court referred to legislative 
history to determine the basis for congressional authority – the Fourteenth 
Amendment.60  Even when the constitutional analysis is performed and 
legislative history gives some insight in to the powers contemplated by 
Congress, the legislative history only gives the opinion of one or a few 
members of Congress and is not the official position of the Congress.61  
Still, it may provide some evidence of a constitutional analysis. 
Of course once Congress passes legislation, with or without any 
constitutional analysis, the legislation moves to the executive branch, 
where the president then takes action.62 
B. Executive Analysis 
Upon receiving legislation from Congress, the President must 
address the bill.63  In theory, the President receives legislation from 
Congress, analyzes it for constitutionality, and signs or vetoes the bill 
 
 57  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (2000). 
 58  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004).  
 59  Id. at 606.  
 60  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (“Congress relied on its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA’s 
provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States.”).  See Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-11, at 13-14 (1993); H. R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 
(1993). 
 61  See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805 (2008); Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapath Services, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (“As we have repeatedly held, the 
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic 
material.  Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they 
shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous 
terms.  Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative 
understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious 
criticisms.  First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.  
Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not 
themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee 
members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive 
to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to 
achieve through the statutory text.”). 
 62  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 63  Id.  
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based on that analysis.64  Commonly, there is no indication that the 
President has conducted any constitutional analysis.65  In some 
circumstances, though, evidence of this analysis appears when a 
President vetoes legislation and explains constitutional concerns.66  Even 
when a President demonstrates some analysis, the President is not 
required to have a constitutional reason or purpose for a veto and may 
veto bills for purely political reasons.67  Presidents have used 
“presidential nullification” to ignore, or to direct that the Department of 
Justice not enforce, provisions that they deem unconstitutional, though 
there may not be evidence of constitutional concerns in these situations.68  
Presidents have issued signing statements to send a message to Congress 
that they are willing to sign the bill, but are not going to enforce certain 
provisions that, in their analyses, are unconstitutional.69  While this may 
 
 64  See, John T. Pierpont, Jr., Checking Executive Disregard, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 
331-32 (2010).  
 65  See John C. Eastman, Judicial Review Of Unenumerated Rights: Does Marbury’s 
Holding Apply In A Post-Warren Court World?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713, 735 (2005).  
Contra, Statement by President Barack Obama, Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 11, 2009) 
(stating that H.R. 1105 is “a legitimate constitutional function, and one that promotes the 
value of transparency, to indicate when a bill that is presented for Presidential signature 
includes provisions that are subject to well-founded constitutional objections.”), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Statement-from-the-President-on-the-signing-of-HR-1105/ [hereinafter Statement by 
President Obama].  For more information on signing statements and their description of the 
constitutionality of bills, see generally, Jeremy Seeley, How the Signing Statement Thought 
it Killed the Veto; How the Veto May Have Killed the Signing Statement, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 
167 (2008); Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, Symposium: The Last Word? The 
Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements: The President Signing 
Statements Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 11, 12 (2007).  See also, e.g., Note: 
Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597 
(2006); Todd Garvey, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Presidential Signing Statements: 
Constitutional and Institutional Implications (2012). 
 66  See Michael T. Crabb, “The Executive Branch Shall Construe”: The Canon of 
Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing Statement, 56 KAN. L. REV. 711, 713 
(2008) (discussing the Article I, Section 7 veto requirements). 
 67  Between the founding of the nation and August 18, 2016, Presidents have vetoed a 
total of 2,571 bills.  Of those, 1,066 were pocket vetoes (where the President takes no action 
on the bill but cannot return it to Congress within the required 10 days because Congress is 
not in session).  Therefore, 1,505 bills have been vetoed by Presidents and sent back to 
Congress.  See History, Art, and Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, PRESIDENTIAL 
VETOES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/.  Of 
those 1,505, it is not known how many were vetoed based on constitutional concerns and how 
many were based on purely political reasons.  Some pundits argue that several recent vetoes 
were politically motivated.  See, e.g., Anthea Mitchell, 10 Most Important Presidential Vetoes 
in Recent History, THE CHEAT SHEET (Mar. 21, 2015), 
http://www.cheatsheet.com/politics/10-presidential-vetoes-that-shaped-recent-american-
history.html/?a=viewall. 
 68  See Pierpont, supra note 64, at 329.  
 69  See, e.g., Seeley, supra note 65. 
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be a longstanding practice, presidents have been required to provide 
Congress with a report of laws that the executive branch will not enforce 
due to constitutional questions or concerns.70  There is some 
disagreement in the literature as to the date of the first official signing 
statement, but there is some agreement that President Monroe issued it.71  
Even though signing statements have been used for a variety of reasons 
during the last 200 years, they have become somewhat controversial and 
often discussed in law review articles.72 
Specifically, the presidential signing statement is an executive 
communication to Congress about legislation.73  Signing statements may 
serve many functions, including expressing gratitude to Congress for 
successfully passing important legislation, criticizing Congress for not 
going far enough, offering interpretations of the legislation, and 
explaining how the executive branch will implement the legislation.74  
Some signing statements have been used to express concerns about 
constitutionality and to acknowledge that the President will not enforce 
particular provisions.75  This allows the President to avoid a veto while 
expressing concern about constitutionality.76 
These statements often give deference to Congress and do not 
affirmatively declare that a bill is unconstitutional, but instead indicate 
that the President will choose to interpret the bill and enforce the law so 
that it does not infringe upon any presidential constitutional power.77  In 
March 2009, President Barack Obama wrote, “it is a legitimate 
constitutional function, and one that promotes the value of transparency, 
to indicate when a bill that is presented for Presidential signature includes 
 
 70  28 U.S.C. § 530D (2016).  
 71  See Crabb, supra note 66, at 713 (stating that the first signing statements were in 1819 
and 1822); Dolly Kefgen, Signing Statements, History and Issues, 17 THE OAKLAND J. 93, 94 
(2009) (declaring 1822 as the official date of the first signing statement). 
 72  See Crabb, supra note 66, at 717.  
 73  Crabb, supra note 66. 
 74  See Curtis A. Bradley and Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and 
Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 307, 308 (2006) (discussing the uses of signing 
statements by Presidents); Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?: Why and How 
Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 
CATH. U.L. REV. 475, 475-76, 489 (1997) (arguing that the historical use of signing statements 
was highly symbolic and congratulatory and stating that Presidents may use signing 
statements to indicate constitutional defects).  
 75  See Carroll, supra note 74, at 489 (stating that Presidents may use signing statements 
to indicate constitutional defects).  
 76  See Carroll, supra note 74, at 489. 
 77  See Statement by President Obama, supra note 65 (President Obama declaring that “it 
is a legitimate constitutional function, and one that promotes the value of transparency, to 
indicate when a bill that is presented for Presidential signature includes provisions that are 
subject to well-founded constitutional objections.”).  
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provisions that are subject to well-founded constitutional objections.”78  
Thus, presidential signing statements do indicate, at times, that some 
constitutional analysis is occurring. 
Scholars opposed to signing statements containing any indication 
that parts of the law will not be enforced argue that the selective 
enforcement of a signed law is a constitutional violation of the 
Presentment Clause and gives the President excessive legislative 
powers.79  Since as early as 1979, Congress has required the executive 
branch to inform it whenever the executive branch implements a formal 
or informal policy to not enforce a law.80  Federal law states that the 
Attorney General of the United States shall inform Congress if any officer 
of the Department of Justice establishes a policy to not enforce, not apply, 
or not administer any provision of federal statute, rule, or regulation.81  
Between May 8, 1979 and December 4, 2014, 114 of these so-called 
530D letters have been sent to Congress from the executive branch.82  
Included in this list is the February 23, 2011 letter from Attorney General 
Eric Holder to Speaker of the House John Boehner informing the House 
that the United States government would refrain from defending the 
constitutionality of DOMA in the Windsor case.83  In that letter Attorney 
General Holder states that the executive branch determined that DOMA 
violated the Fifth Amendment and so the branch would not support or 
defend it in court.84 
Clearly, the executive constitutional analysis by courts in their 
interpretation of the constitutionality of a law is an interesting and tricky 
subject, and one of much debate. 
C. Judicial Analysis 
When the Supreme Court announced the policy or theory of judicial 
review in Marbury, the Court relied heavily on the direct text of the 
Constitution.85  Through the present era of the Court, Justices look to the 
 
 78  Id.  
 79  See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 74, at 478-79.  
 80  Letters Submitted to Congress Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §503D, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/letters-submitted-congress-pursuant-28-usc-530d  [hereinafter 
Letters Submitted to Congress]. 
 81  28 U.S.C. § 530D (2002). 
 82  Letters Submitted to Congress, supra note 80. 
 83  Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, to The Honorable John Boehner, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/02-23-2011.pdf. 
 84  Id.  
 85  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174-75. 
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text as a starting point to determine constitutionality.86  For example, in 
2003, the Court decided Eldred v. Ashcroft.87  In Eldred, Congress 
extended the length of copyright protection under the intellectual 
property power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.88  A number of 
businesses that routinely used material that had fallen out of copyright 
protection and fallen in to the public domain challenged the increase as 
outside the power of Congress.89  The plaintiff’s argument was that the 
extension, and the history of continuing the extension, created unlimited 
copyright protection, where Article I grants Congress the power to protect 
intellectual property “for limited Times.”90  The Court reviewed the text 
of the Constitution, particularly the term “for limited Times,” and 
determined that the extension still had an end; thus making the term 
limited and within the power granted in Article I.91 
It is perhaps more common for the Court to have to look beyond the 
text of the Constitution to the breadth and interpretation of that text; in 
particular, the Court repeatedly has had to mark boundaries on 
constitutional powers.  One prevalent example throughout history is the 
debate on the scope of the Commerce Clause.92  For approximately two 
hundred years, the Supreme Court consistently expanded the scope of 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.93  In 1824, the Supreme 
Court heard its first major Commerce Clause case.94  In Gibbons v. 
Ogden, the Court faced a conflict between a federal agency giving 
exclusive rights to navigate the waters between New York and New 
Jersey and the same rights being given to someone by the state of New 
York.95  Once the Court resolved that the navigation between the two 
state boundaries would be commerce among the states, the Court held 
that the federal power to regulate commerce among the states preempts 
the state ability to also do so.96 
In what may be seen as the ultimate expansion of the Commerce 
Clause powers, during World War II, the Supreme Court held that a 
farmer could be fined for consuming wheat grown on his own farm 
because the sum total of the wheat consumed and the wheat sold by the 
 
 86  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003). 
 87  Id. at 186.  
 88  Id. at 192-93. 
 89  Id. at 193. 
 90  Id. at 198.  
 91  Id. at 199-207. 
 92  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 93  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 94  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.  
 95  Id. at 1-3.  
 96  Id. at 221. 
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farmer exceeded federal regulations limiting the production of wheat.97  
Arguments that the wheat consumption was purely local in nature and not 
interstate commerce failed; as the Court stated: 
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the 
regulation of commerce among the states.  It extends to those 
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or 
the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make 
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power 
to regulate interstate commerce . . . .98 
Following Wickard, it appeared that Congress had expansive power 
under the Commerce Clause so long as a hypothetical impact on interstate 
commerce could be found.99  It was not until 1995 that the Supreme Court 
surprised Congress (and legal scholars) when it found that the Gun Free 
School Zone Act (“GFSZA”) exceeded that power.100  Given the Court’s 
history of expanding the power, Congress could not have known, or 
guessed for that matter, that the Supreme Court would not find the 
GFSZA within the Commerce power.  Within the next five years, the 
Court used similar reasoning to hold portions of the Violence Against 
Women Act unconstitutional.101 
However, in 2005, the Court considered whether the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”) exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate use and cultivation of 
marijuana.102  In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court noted that the “similarities 
between this case and Wickard are striking.”103  The Court went on to find 
that there was an established illegal market for the drugs, and that the 
purpose of the CSA was to regulate that market by manipulating supply 
and demand.104  As such, Congress was regulating commerce, albeit 
illegal commerce, in passing the CSA; therefore, the Act fell within the 
powers of Congress.105  In the dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, noted that the role of the Court is 
to adequately define the powers of Congress to protect the ability of the 
states to govern in the traditional spheres of health and welfare.106  Based 
 
 97  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 130-31.  
 98  Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)). 
 99  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-71 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 was a valid exercise of the Commerce Power, without any indication that the Congress 
relied on the Commerce Power when drafting, discussing and passing the act). 
 100  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.  
 101  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.  
 102  Raich, 545 U.S. at 5. 
 103  Id. at 18. 
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 26.  
 106  Id. at 42-43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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on her reading of precedent, Justice O’Connor argued that the activity in 
the case, was beyond the reach of federal regulation.107  However, Justice 
O’Connor’s analysis did not prevail and the outer limit of the Commerce 
Clause power remains in a state of flux.108 
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that it will give 
great deference to an act of Congress and presume constitutionality 
absent clear evidence of a constitutional violation.  For example, in 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, Justices O’Connor and 
Stevens reaffirmed that the Court has an obligation to avoid addressing 
questions of constitutionality when possible.109  In quoting earlier cases 
the Justices stated, “[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and . . . a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided.”110  This concept of constitutional avoidance further demands 
that the Court not address a constitutional issue unless it is necessary.  
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in the Boumediene v. Bush, noted, “[o]ur 
precedents have long counseled us to avoid deciding . . . hypothetical 
questions of constitutional law. . . . This is a ‘fundamental rule of judicial 
restraint.’”111  A lack of analysis by the President and the Congress may 
lead to a necessary interpretation or analysis of constitutional issues that 
could otherwise be avoided.  This, in addition to the unfounded deference, 
creates unnecessary work and a risk of constitutional absenteeism. 
The principle of constitutional avoidance is based on the assumption 
that the members of Congress are constitutionally aware and are 
upholding their oath.112  However, Professor Eastman, director of The 
Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, argues that 
Congress is ignoring the issues with constitutional authority because that 
authority belongs to the courts.113  However, according to Professor 
Eastman, the courts also are ignoring the issue to some extent, through 
deference to the Congress.  As such, neither the courts nor Congress is 
really protecting or defending the constitution.114  Recently, in 
Boumediene, the Court supported this supposition by stating, “[t]he usual 
 
 107  Id. at 51 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 108  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 109  McConnell v. Fed. Election Commn., 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003), overruled by Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 110  Id.  (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, (1932)); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 331, (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982). 
 111  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2281 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 112  Eastman, supra note 65. 
 113  Eastman, supra note 65, at 736.  
 114  Eastman, supra note 65, at 736.  
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presumption is that Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of 
office, considered the constitutional issue and determined the amended 
statute to be a lawful one; and the Judiciary, in light of that determination, 
proceeds to its own independent judgment on the constitutional question 
when required to do so in a proper case.”115  Justice Scalia, in dissent 
noted, “We have frequently stated that we owe great deference to 
Congress’s view that a law it has passed is constitutional.”116 
The problem created by this deference is that the Court essentially 
gives Congress permission to not perform any constitutional analysis.  
There are at least two potential solutions to this problem.  First, the 
Supreme Court could apply a less deferential standard to legislation 
passed by Congress and signed by the President.  This option still relieves 
the Congress and the President from their duties and oaths.  Second, and 
preferably, Congress could more clearly enunciate its constitutional 
analysis and the President could then either concur or disagree with that 
analysis.  To achieve this result, either the Court could attempt to force 
Congress to apply constitutional analysis, setting up a battle between the 
branches, or Congress could self-regulate, and apply constitutional 
analysis on its own accord.  During the last twenty years, Congress has 
occasionally attempted to address these issues through legislation – either 
attempting to change the authority of the president or attempting to 
increase accountability of the Congress. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS IN THE EVALUATION PROCESS 
Congress has attempted to address concerns over constitutional 
analysis and the legislative process on a number of occasions. In one 
instance Congress attempted to give the President more legislative power 
through the line-item veto.117  Congress also tried to limit the executive 
power to influence constitutional interpretation by banning federal courts 
from using Presidential signing statements as a source of constitutional 
analysis.118  Finally, Congress repeatedly has attempted to increase its 
own accountability by requiring each bill to articulate the specific source 
of authority in the Constitution.119  This section looks briefly at each of 
 
 115  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2243. 
 116  Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 117  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436, 442-448 (1998).  Though the Court did not rule on this 
specific issue, the Court did note that they received extensive information on the issue of 
delegating legislative power to the President.  
 118  See S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007).  An identical bill was introduced to the House of 
Representatives on October 10, 2007.  
 119  See H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1018, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 175, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 384, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2458, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1359, 
110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 450, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 125, 112th Cong. (2011), H.R. 109, 
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these attempts. 
A. The Line Item Veto Act 
In an attempt to avoid full vetoes by the President, an early 
intervention to the current process entailed the creation of the line item 
veto, where the President could essentially divide legislation presented to 
him or her and “sign” particular sections.120  The line item veto principle 
stemmed from an argument between the executive and legislative 
branches of the government related to the appropriation of funds by 
Congress and the refusal of the executive branch to spend those funds.121  
According to legislative history, President Jefferson first refused to spend 
monies allocated by Congress, asserting that the executive branch has 
some discretion in executing the laws passed by Congress.122  In April 
1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Line Item Veto 
Act officially authorizing this veto process.123  This statute allowed the 
President to negate or modify three types of legislative action after 
signing the bill into law: dollar amounts for any item that is considered 
discretionary spending by the executive branch, the dollar amount of any 
new direct spending, or any temporary tax benefits passed by 
Congress.124  After President Clinton invoked the line item veto to cancel 
several provisions of two different bills, several organizations filed a suit, 
asking the court to declare the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional.125  In 
1998, the United States Supreme Court did so, stating that the process 
was in direct conflict with the presentment powers as outlined in Article 
I, Section 7.126  According to the Court, allowing the President to modify 
 
113th Cong. (2013) and S. 109, 114th Cong. (2015).  Senate bills also were introduced in the 
110th, 111th, 112th and 113th Congress.  See S.3159, 110th Cong. (2007), S.1319, 111th 
Cong. (2009), S. 1248, 112th Cong. (2011) and S. 1404, 113th Cong. (2013).  The bill has 
been cosponsored over time by as few as 34 Representatives and as many as 73.  In 2008, for 
the first time, an identical bill was introduced in the Senate with 23 sponsors. See S. 3159, 
110th Cong. (2008).  This bill was introduced by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma with 22 
co-sponsors.  In all, the sponsors represent 18 different states. 
 120  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420-21. 
 121  S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT, Government Printing 
Office, S. REP. NO. 104-10, at 6 (1995), available at https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt 
/srpt10/CRPT-104srpt10.pdf. 
 122  Id. at 2.  
 123  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420-21. 
 124  Id. at 436.  
 125  Id. at 425-26.  Immediately after the Line Item Veto was passed, several members of 
Congress who had voted against it also filed suit to have it declared unconstitutional.  The 
Supreme Court held that the members of Congress did not have standing to sue.  Id. at 421.  
This second case was brought by hospitals, cities, unions and farming cooperatives who 
alleged harm by the veto of the specific provisions. 
 126  Id. at 421.  
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or negate sections of a statute gave the President legislative authority.127  
The constitution limits the President’s legislation-related powers to 
presenting to Congress for consideration and either signing or vetoing 
legislation presented to him or her after passing the legislative process.128  
The Line Item Veto Act was declared unconstitutional because it allowed 
the President to modify or negate parts of legislation already enacted in 
to law by signature.129  The appropriate method for handling such issues 
is for the President to veto the entire piece of legislation while sending a 
statement to Congress with the reasons for the veto, outlining the 
constitutional concerns and inviting Congress to either correct or delete 
those concerns and resubmit the bill. 
B. The Presidential Signing Statements Act 
On June 29, 2007, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania introduced 
S. 1747: The Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007.130  In this bill 
Senator Specter referred to the Article I, Section 7 power of the President 
to either sign or veto a bill.131  He then noted that several presidents have 
issued signing statements to accompany their signature of a bill.132  
Senator Specter then postulated that courts have used these signing 
statements as a source of authority in interpreting the Acts of Congress.133  
He argued that this use of signing statements is problematic for several 
reasons. First, because it is merely the opinion of the President, it does 
not have the authority as a source of interpretation.134  In addition, the use 
of signing statements by courts is neither consistent nor predictable, 
creating great uncertainty in the interpretation of the statutes.135  After 
reciting the problems with the use of signing statements, the bill 
definitively forbid the use of any presidential signing statement by federal 
or state courts as a source of authority in determining whether an act of 
Congress is constitutional.136  The bill also required courts to allow 
Congress to participate in any case regarding the constitutionality of a 
statute for which a presidential signing statement was issued to clarify the 
 
 127  Id. at 438.  
 128  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438. 
 129  Id. at 448.  
 130  S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007).  An identical bill was introduced to the House of 
Representatives on October 10, 2007.  That bill was referred to the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. 
 131  S. 1747 § 2, ¶ 1. 
 132  Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
 133  Id. ¶ 4. 
 134  Id. ¶ 5. 
 135  Id. ¶ 6. 
 136  S. 1747 § 4. 
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Congressional perspective on the question.137  In sum, the bill requires 
that Congress be allowed to justify its passage of a statute.  The bill was 
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and never came forth.138 
C. The Enumerated Powers Act – A Lesson in Accountability and 
Transparency 
In 1997, Arizona representative John Shadegg introduced a bill 
entitled The Enumerated Powers Act.139  This legislation has been 
introduced during each successive Congress; however the bill has 
consistently been referred to committee and has expired at the end of each 
term of Congress.140  It may be that the committees to which the bill was 
referred let it die due to issues requiring more immediate attention.  It is 
also possible that the committee members did not want to force Congress 
to perform a constitutional analysis.  Furthermore, members of the 
committees have been satisfied with the status quo – letting the court 
system bear the burden, responsibility, and power of determining 
constitutionality. 
The current version of this bill requires that, “Each Act of Congress, 
bill and resolution, or conference report thereon or amendment thereto, 
shall contain a concise explanation of the specific authority in the 
Constitution of the United States relied upon as the basis for enacting 
each portion of the measure.”141  The Act itself contains a statement of 
constitutional authority.142  Per the author of the bill, the authority comes 
from Article 1, Section 5, clause 2 which reads, “Each House may 
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly 
 
 137  Id.  
 138  Actions Overview of S. 1747, CONGRESS, available at https://www.congress.gov 
/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/1747/all-actions?q={%22search%22%3A[%22 
signing+statements%22]}&resultIndex=3. 
 139  See H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997).  
 140  See H.R. 292, 105th Cong.  (1997); H.R. 1018, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 175, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 384, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2458, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1359, 
110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 450, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 125, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 109, 
113th Cong. (2013); S.109, 114th Cong. (2015).  Senate bills also were introduced in the 
110th, 111th, 112th and 113th Congress.  See S.3159, 110th Cong. (2007); S.1319, 111th 
Cong. (2009); S. 1248, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1404, 113th Cong. (2013).  The bill has been 
cosponsored over time by as few as 34 Representatives and as many as 73.  In 2008, for the 
first time, an identical bill was introduced in the Senate with 23 sponsors.  See, S. 3159, 110th 
Cong. (2008).  This bill was introduced by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma with 22 co-
sponsors. In all, the sponsors represent 18 different states.  The current version of the 
legislation, S. 109, 114th Cong. (2015) has been referred to the Senate Committee on Rules 
and Administration.  The current version of the bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator 
Dean Heller of Nevada, with no cosponsors.  
 141  S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015).   
 142  Id. § 3. 
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behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”143  
Unlike prior versions, the current version explicitly states that citation to 
the spending clause, the necessary and proper clause, and the general 
welfare clause in the Constitution does not satisfy the requirement.144  
The current version also prohibits the use of the Commerce Clause for 
anything other than the regulation of buying or selling goods or 
services.145 
A law’s effect as written does not render a bill unconstitutional or 
unenforceable without its statement of authority.  Instead, it creates a 
procedure for lawmakers to force clarification on the authority for the 
law.  More importantly, if the bill were to pass, and if lawmakers used 
the point-of-order procedure, bills would gain transparency and clarity.  
This bill would help the President complete his constitutional analysis 
before signing and allowing the courts to focus on the scope of powers 
rather than relying on legislative history (if it exists) to determine the 
source of authority for the bill. 
V. THE MOST APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS – 
THE MORE INFORMATION THE BETTER 
With their oaths of office, the President, Justices of the Supreme 
Court, and members of Congress vow to preserve, protect, support, and 
defend the Constitution.146  A part of that duty should be to interpret and 
analyze their actions, as well as the actions of branches where they hold 
constitutional checks and balances.  This section will look at the 
legislative process from start to finish and outline the most transparent 
and effective process for informing the analysis. 
First, as the legislature works through the legislative writing and 
approval process, both the House of Representatives and the Senate may 
leave behind a legislative history that demonstrates the issues how they 
have been resolved in the past.  The requirement of the Enumerated 
Powers Act should be in place to help guide interpretations, in addition 
to the thoughts of individual members of Congress as a source of analysis. 
The passage of The Enumerated Powers Act could result in several 
changes in the legislative process, from the introductory discussions on a 
bill to the passage and presentment to the President, from the President’s 
signature to any evaluation done in the courts.  While it is impossible to 
know whether the law would impact the number of bills before Congress, 
 
 143  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
 144  S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(c) (2015).  
 145  Id.  
 146  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  The text of each oath is slightly different 
but contain same the basic premise. 
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it is possible that the bills that are before Congress will be more focused.  
In addition, the bills will be more transparent for evaluation by the 
President and the courts. 
The requirement to outline the source of authority for its actions will 
indicate to courts, and to the general population, that the members of 
Congress are mindful of the limited powers in the Constitution.  
Additionally, it also will help focus the courts on the nature of the dispute 
– the boundaries of Congressional power under particular clauses of 
Article I, Section 8. 
Given that Congress often passes enormous bills with multiple 
issues in them, there is a risk that the members of Congress will simply 
list as many powers as might apply to a massive piece of legislation.  The 
Enumerated Powers Act, as most recently introduced, requires a “concise 
explanation of the specific authority in the Constitution of the United 
States relied upon as the basis for enacting each portion of the 
measure.”147  In order to be effective, the Enumerated Powers Act should 
be amended and passed with two possible provisions.  One possible 
provision would clarify that massive bills addressing a plethora of issues 
under a variety of Congressional powers either is forbidden.  Another 
possible provision would require that the source of the power for each 
different issue be specifically identified in the bill or in an appendix to 
the bill.  This law has the potential to create a more focused view of the 
role of the Congress as its members look for authority for their actions.  
These possible provisions would add a clause to the bills may cause 
members of Congress to reflect on their own beliefs in our system and 
the purpose of the Constitution.  As a member votes for a bill, he or she 
would be voting not only for the substance of the bill, but also publicly 
stating and reaffirming his or her belief in the proper interpretation of the 
Constitution.  In addition, by declaring the source of authority for the bill, 
Congress could focus the contents of the bill to items within that 
authority.  Bills would become more focused on topic instead of broad 
pieces of legislation with multiple issues and pork.148 
In enunciating the authority under which actions are taken, Congress 
also has an opportunity to shape the Constitution.  As courts review laws 
there would be an articulated interpretation of the Constitution as opposed 
to an assumption that lawmakers considered a law’s constitutionality.  If 
Congress is thoughtful and long-sighted in its interpretations of the 
Constitution, the courts may determine that the reasonable interpretation 
 
 147  S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015).  
 148  Pork refers to money spent on pet projects of members of Congress.  See Sharyl 
Attkisson, Group: Nearly $20B In Pork In Fiscal ‘09, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009, 6:17 PM), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/14/eveningnews/main4945339.shtml.  
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is worthy of affirmation.  For example, had Congress been more specific 
in the legislation discussed in the Morrison case, the court may have been 
receptive to discussion that violence against women does indeed impact 
commerce.  Instead, the Court was forced to look to the unofficial 
statements in the legislative history to determine that the Commerce 
Clause was the purported power.149  Had Congress specifically stated that 
the bill was passed under the Commerce power, the legislative history 
would have had even more impact as the Court could look at the 
discussions in favor of passing the legislation under the Commerce power 
to determine the rationale for the interpretation of that clause.150  In 
addition to the Court having access, The Enumerated Powers Act asks 
Congress to be thoughtful about its belief in the purpose and meaning of 
the Constitution and to set forth those beliefs where people can find them 
and review them.  The Act makes Congress’ interpretations more 
accessible by requiring that the interpretation be articulated.151 
More accessible interpretations do not necessarily mean final 
interpretations.  Obvious problems would result if Congress were the 
final interpreter of the Constitution.  First, this situation would render the 
concept of the veto nearly useless.  Should the President veto legislation 
that he or she believes is unconstitutional, Congress would simply reply 
that the legislation is constitutional under its interpretation.  The 
legislation then would stand as legitimate.  The impact on the judiciary 
would be similar; if the courts found a law unconstitutional, Congress 
would just reply that it is constitutional because they articulated their 
power for passing it.  Under this hypothetical scheme where Congress has 
ultimate authority to determine the scope of its own power, the courts 
never could declare legislation passed by Congress as unconstitutional.  
As soon as a court would declare a statute unconstitutional, the Congress 
simply asserts that the majority of the Congress interpreted the 
Constitution so that the legislation was constitutional and the courts 
would be overruled.  Even stranger, if the Congress puts forth in the 
legislation a statement that the legislation is within its own interpretation 
of its powers, then no court could even entertain a challenge.  Further 
concerns exist as to the desirability of a political body to be the final 
interpreter – as each election creates turnover in seats and possibility in 
control, the interpretation of the constitution could change.  These 
 
 149  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.  
 150  Because Senators or Representatives would have discussed the constitutional power 
as part of the debate on the legislation, arguments that the legislation was a legitimate use of 
the Commerce power would have persuaded at least a majority of the floor and thus could be 
seen as more legitimate than mere statements that the law might be legitimate under certain 
powers.  
 151  S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015). 
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problems also exist should the President be seen as the final interpreter. 
Second, as the President receives legislation from Congress, he or 
she must sign the bill into law or veto it and send it back to the Congress 
for further consideration.152  Should the President sign the legislation 
without comment, one may be able to assume that the President 
acknowledges that the legislation is within the stated powers of Congress 
and that the President agrees with the Congress on its interpretation of the 
breadth of that power.  The President could go further and declare 
agreement with the Congressional interpretation of its powers and 
endorse the activity as a constitutional activity. 
In the case of a veto, the President is constitutionally required to 
inform Congress of the reasons for the veto.153  If the reason is related to 
constitutional interpretation, the President should clearly articulate how 
his or her interpretation may differ from that of Congress, especially if 
the power is specifically set forth in the legislation per the Enumerated 
Powers Act.  If the bill contains provisions that the President does not 
believe are constitutional, then the President should feel free to so note, 
even if he or she signs the bill in to law.  The President could continue 
the recent trend and sign legislation with a signing statement that 
indicates where the President feels that Congress may have gone beyond 
its power or clarifications on how the President intends to interpret the 
legislation so that it does not go beyond the powers of Congress.  Again 
in this situation the President would have the specific clause in the bill to 
address the powers of Congress.  The President then should be able to set 
the priorities of the executive branch, which may include a decreased 
priority to prosecute and enforce laws for which the President has 
expressed constitutional concerns.  Regardless of the President’s 
position, any statement on the constitutionality would give the Supreme 
Court at least two official declarations of interpretation as opposed to the 
current system where the Court relies primarily on precedent and 
academic discussions from law review articles.154 
Just as Congressional power to enunciate the final interpretation of 
constitutional powers would negate certain presidential powers, final 
interpretation by the President would virtually negate the veto override.  
Once a president determined that the legislation was unconstitutional, and 
 
 152  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 153  Id.  
 154  On January 21, 2009, one day after being inaugurated, President Obama signed an 
Executive Order related to the releasing of the records of prior presidents, making them easier 
to access and setting forth a process for prior presidents to object.  See Exec. Order No. 13,489, 
3 C.F.R. 13489 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the 
_press_office/ExecutiveOrderPresidentialRecords/.  
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vetoed the legislation, Congress would be powerless to override the veto.  
Even if the super-majority voted to override, the legislation would still be 
deemed unconstitutional because of the President’s role as final 
interpreter.  Like the legislative concerns over politics, presidential 
interpretation is highly subject to politics.  First term presidents may 
interpret the Constitution in light of the impact on reelection.  Since 
elections are every four years, it is questionable whether constitutional 
stability would exist.  Without being the final interpreter, the President 
still would have an opportunity to influence the discussions about the 
Constitution in the courts. 
Finally, when a law is challenged, the federal judges and Justices 
have the authority to interpret the Constitution.155  Judges and Justices 
should be allowed to use any resources at their disposal to guide them in 
their understanding and interpretation of the law.  The proper death of the 
Presidential Signing Statements Act supports this notion.156  Judges and 
Justices should look to legislative history to determine the intent of 
Congress in passing the legislation, the comments of the President in any 
signing statement, and secondary sources such as the discussions and 
interpretations offered by legal academics and others in academic 
publications.  Using all of the resources available will assist the judiciary 
in analyzing the scope of any disagreement about the constitutionality of 
a statute and address more robustly the arguments as judges and Justices 
make their final interpretations. 
Having these declarations from the legislative and executive 
branches could result in cleaner opinions and more open discussion about 
the purpose and meaning of the Constitution.  Judges analyzing the 
constitutionality of statutes would have a starting point in the text of the 
legislation itself.  The courts could look directly at the source of authority 
under which Congress was purporting to pass legislation and focus on the 
scope of that power.  The judicial discussion would focus not on whether 
Congress had authority to pass the legislation at all, but whether Congress 
misinterpreted the Constitution in analyzing the constitutional provision. 
The Enumerated Powers Act does not attempt to change the Court’s 
ability to interpret the Constitution.157  For example, in Morrison, the 
Congress broadly identified Article I, Section 8, as the source of its 
authority to pass the Violence Against Women Act.158  In subsequent 
lawsuits, the lawyers for the United States and the lower courts looked to 
 
 155  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 156  See supra Part IV.B. 
 157  S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015).  This requires Congress to articulate its authority 
but the bill does not state that the courts must accept that articulation.  
 158  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
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legislative history to determine that Congress meant the Commerce 
Clause as its source of authority.159  Had the Congress been more specific, 
as the Enumerated Powers Act would require, the lawyers and Courts 
would not have had to even go to the legislative history to determine 
which power Congress was purporting to exercise.  Instead, the courts 
could begin with the heart of the argument – whether Congress correctly 
interpreted the breadth and scope of that power.  In Morrison, the Court 
first had to identify the Commerce Clause and then move to the 
discussion where it found that the Congressional interpretation of the 
Commerce power was incorrect.160  The Court specifically pointed to the 
appearance that Congress was so broadly defining interstate commerce to 
include all activity as interstate commerce so that the federal government 
would become the sole regulating body.161  The crux of the Court’s 
opinion is that Congress misinterpreted the Commerce Clause to allow 
the passage of the Violence Against Women Act and that the Court was 
clarifying the boundaries of the power.162  This role of the court was not 
changed because Congress had set forth, at least generally, evidence that 
a constitutional analysis had occurred. 
Given that there is room for disagreement in interpretation of the 
Constitution, the final question to answer is the question of finality or 
supremacy.  Though in the early days of our nation it was not clear that 
any branch should be a final interpreter, the Court’s role has been to 
provide final interpretation to the provisions of the Constitution.163  Given 
the problems discussed above with giving the executive and legislative 
branch final authority, it should remain clear that the Court is still the 
proper place for finality. 
Since federal judges and Supreme Court Justices are appointed for 
life, they are able to focus on the Constitution and its meanings more 
easily than those who are more susceptible to the political will of the 
people.  In addition, because the Justices hold their appointments 
typically for longer than Presidents or a majority of legislatures, the 
philosophies and interpretations are likely to change slower than if 
elected officials were the final interpreters.164 As Alexander Hamilton 
said in the seventy-eighth Federalist Paper, “It is far more rational to 
suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between 
 
 159  Id.  
 160  Id. at 607-19.  
 161  Id. at 614.  
 162  Id. at 627. 
 163  See Segall, supra note 6. 
 164  See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall and the Politics of Constitutional 
Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1228 n.14 (2003) (postulating that even when the Court is 
political, its politics differ greatly from those of elected officials).  
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the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority [than to assume that the 
legislature should be the constitutional judge of its own actions].”165  
Hamilton further pointed out that the role of the judge is to interpret the 
law and that the constitution is a “fundamental law.”166  The Court would 
be better able to focus on interpretation if the Congress is more specific 
with its statements of authority and if the President is clear in his support 
or disagreement with those statements. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The political and judicial leaders of our nation have sworn to uphold, 
protect, support, and defend the Constitution of the United States.  As 
such, each branch of government has a responsibility to ensure that the 
actions taken are within the bounds of constitutional authority.  This is 
not always an easy task as the number of laws declared unconstitutional 
may show.167  It is often broad in language and leaves room for 
interpretation.  Because of this, each branch has a duty to perform an 
analysis and interpret the Constitution in a transparent way.  The passage 
of the Enumerated Powers Act will increase transparency at the 
Congressional level.  The use of signing statements by the President to 
share his or her interpretation also will inform the courts and the public 
about the posture of the executive branch toward the breadth of the 
constitutional powers.  Finally, the use of this information by the courts, 
with the ultimate authority of the courts to adopt, modify, or reject the 
interpretation of either Congress or the President, will create a more 
transparent and balanced discussion about the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
 
 
 165  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).   
 166  Id.  See also, Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John 
Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 408 (2004). 
 167  See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
